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reason for 'granting immunity from tort liability to charities. The
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Vrginia is to be commended for
abrogating this archaic doctrine, and the highest courts of Virginia
and other states which still adhere to the immunity doctrine are urged
to follow West Virginia and not wait for legislative action.
CHARLES GLIDDEN JOHNSO'N
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY FOR PUBLIC
CONTRACTORS ENGAGED IN BLASTING
In V. M. Green & Co. v. Thomas' the Supreme Court of Appeals
of Virginia recently decided the question, novel in Virginia, whether
a contractor performing a contract with the state is strictly liable for
concussion damage resulting from blasting.2 Defendant contractor,
being sued for damages to plaintiff's home, was performing a contract
with the state for the construction of an interstate highway. There was
ample evidence to show that vibrations and concussions from six dyna-
mite blasts supervised by a "certified blaster" caused damage to plain-
tiff's home four hundred and seventy-four feet away. Plaintiff's theories
of liability were negligence and strict liability. The plaintiff, unable
to establish negligence, contended that defendant should be held
strictly liable. The trial court instructed the jury to find for the plain-
tiff "irrespective of negligence" if they believed defendant's blasting
was the "direct and proximate" cause of the damage. The jury re-
turned a verdict for the plaintiff and defendant appealed, assigning this
instruction as error. The Supreme Court of Appeals reversed and en-
tered judgment for defendant.
The Supreme Court of Appeals based its decision of non-liability
almost entirely upon the question of the contractor's right to share
the immunity of the state and omitted any discussion of strict liability
for concussion damage.3 In support of its decision that defendant was
entitled to immunity, the court cited five cases from other jurisdic-
'205 Va. 9o3, 140 S.E.2d 635 (1965).
2 Previous Virginia decisions are distinguishable. Infra note 9.
*'The court cited B. G. Young & Sons, Inc. v. Kirk, 202 Va. 176, 182, 183, 116
S.E.2d 38, 42, 43 (196o), as authority for the proposition that the burden is on the
plaintiff to prove that the defendant did some specific act of negligence and that
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur would not apply in such a case. But the question
of liability irrespective of negligence was not before the court in Kirk, and the
plaintiff had conceded the application of res ipsa loquitur. Id. at 42.
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tions.4 Although these cases held that there was immunity, they are
all distinguishable from the principal case. Two are not blasting cases;8
two involving blasting suggest that in those jurisdictions liability for
concussion damage must be based upon nuisance or negligence theories
to the exclusion of strict liability;6 and in the last, also involving blast-
ing, the court seemed to consider the work as having been done by the
government.
7
There are only three other reported Virginia cases in which re-
covery for blasting concussion damage has been sought,$ and in all
three cases damages were denied for reasons other than the rejection
of strict liability.9 None has decided whether liability may be imposed
for concussion damage irrespective of negligence.' 0 Only one of these
cases, B.G. Young & Sons, Inc. v. Kirk," involved a defendant who
4Supra note i, at 637.
'Chargois v. Grimmett & James, 36 So. 2d 390 (La. App. 1948) (land grading
for drainage project); Valley Forge Gardens, Inc. v. Morrissey, 385 Pa. 477, 123
A.2d 888 (1956) (damage caused by erosion of a fill).
"In Nelson v. McKenzie-Hague Co., 192 Minn. 18o, 256 N.W. 96 (1934), plaintiff
brought suit upon a private nuisance theory for damage caused to his property
by concussions started by defendant's blasting under a state contract for the con-
struction of a bridge. The court held the statute defining a private nuisance in-
applicable to a contractor constructing a bridge under a contract with the state.
In Benner v. Atlantic Dredging Co., 134 N.Y. 156, 31 N.E. 328 (1892), plaintiff
sought damages for injury to his property caused by vibrations from defendant
contractor's blasting, alleging that blasting constituted a nuisance. Recovery was
denied because defendant had the authority of the United States to do the work
carefully and there was no showing of any negligence.
'In Pumphrey v. J. A. Jones Constr. Co., 250 Iowa 559, 94 N.W.2d 737 (1959),
defendant contractor caused concussion damage to plaintiff's property by blasting
performed under a contract with the United States and supervised by govern-
ment authorities. It was stipulated that defendant had not been negligent, and
the case was argued on a strict liability theory. The court agreed that Iowa fol-
lowed the strict liability theory in blasting cases, but granted the defendant
governmental immunity, relying heavily upon the fact of the strict supervision by
the government and its approval of the blasting specifications, which were made
a part of the contract. Discussion of this case in 12 Stan. L. Rev. 691, 693 (1960),
indicates that another objection to Pumphrey is that the court failed to apply
federal law, and that other federal decisions do not grant immunity in such a
situation.
"Barnes v. Graham Virginia Quarries, Inc., 204 Va. 414, 132 S.E.2d 395 (1963);
B. G. Young & Sons, Inc. v. Kirk, supra note 3; Pope v. Overbay, 196 Va. 288, 83
S.E.2d 365 (1954).
'In Pope v. Overbay, supra note 8, the court upheld the jury's finding that
there was no casual connection between the damage and the blasting; in B. G.
Young and Sons, Inc. v. Kirk, supra note 3, the court relied upon a release by the
plaintiff; and in Barnes v. Graham Virginia Quarries, Inc., supra note 8, the case
was decided upon a nuisance theory and plaintiff was unable to prove a casual con-
nection between blasting and damage.
'5 lbid.
uSupra note 3.
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was a state blasting contractor, and there the question of governmen-
tal immunity was not presented. Kirk is cited in the principal case for
the proposition that the plaintiff must prove that the defendant or
an employee was negligent in order to recover for concussion damage
to his property,12 but in Kirk the question whether liability for blast-
ing damage may be incurred irrespective of negligence was never be-
fore the court since the plaintiff had released all claims for damage in-
curred in the construction of the highway except those resulting from
negligence or departure from the plans referred to in the deed.' 3
The questions whether Virginia imposes strict liability for blasting
and whether a state blasting contractor is entitled to share the state's
immunity from suit had never been decided by the Supreme Court of
Appeals of Virginia before the principal case. The Supreme Court of
Appeals avoids the first question and answers the second, holding
that a non-negligent state contractor whose blasting causes injury
to another's property is entitled to share the state's immunity.
No case has been found which fails to impose liability on any
contractor for negligently caused blasting concussion damage, nor
has any case been found which extends governmental immunity to
such a contractor. As to the non-negligent state contractor, there are
two conflicting decisional approaches. The first is the imposition of
liability upon the state blasting contractor irrespective of negligence
(based upon one of several theories),14 and the other is the extension
of the states' governmental immunity to the state blasting contractor. 5
The first approach leads, rather obviously, to liability, and the second
results in excusing from liability. When a court is presented with a
factual situation similar to the principal case, it should first determine
whether the state blasting contractor would be liable if he were not
working for the state. If the court decides that liability would other-
wise exist, it must then determine whether the contractor should be
excused from liability because of his status as a state contractor.
As to the initial determination of the liability of the state blast-
ing contractor if he were not performing a contract with the state,
there is a division of authority as to liability absent negligence. A
minority of jurisdictions16 hold that there is no liability for such non-
'Supra note i, at 637.-
3B. G. Young & Sons, Inc. v. Kirk, supra note 3, at 42.
"Infra notes 19, 20, 21, 22.
2Infra note 23, at 827-28.
"OLedbetter-Johnson Co. v. Hawkins, 267 Ala. 458, 1o3 So. 2d 748 (1958); Rost v.
Union Pac. R.R., 95 Kan.. 713, 149 Pac 679 (1915); Williams v. Codell Constr. Co.,
253 Ky. 166, 69 S.W.2d 20 (1934); Albison v. Robbins & White, Inc., 151 Me. 114,
ni6 A.2d 6o8 (1955); Dalton v. Demos Bros. Gen. Contractors, Inc., 334 Mass. 377,
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negligently caused damage. These courts are clinging to the common
law distinction between trespass and trespass on the case,17 and con-
sider the concussion injury indirect for which there is no liability with-
out proof of negligence. This distinction has been denounced as a
marriage of scientific ignorance and procedural technicality' s and has
been rejected by the majority of courts.
A majority of jurisdictions impose liability for blasting concussion
damage absent negligence on the part of the blasting contractor with-
out distinguishing between damage from flying objects and damage
from concussion waves. 19 These courts rely upon various theories in
granting compensation. One is that a vibration is just as much a tres-
pass as a rock hurled upon the land,20 because both involve invasion of
the property. Nuisance is another theory the courts use to impose liabi-
lity.21 A third theory used to impose liability is the doctrine of strict
135 N.E.2d 646 (1956); Vadleigh v. City of Manchester, too N.H. 277, 123 A.2d 831
(1956); Holland House Co. v. Baird, 169 N.Y. 136, 62 N.E. 149 (190); Thompson v.
Green Mountain Power Corp., 120 Vt. 478, 144 A.2d 786 (1958). A Kentucky court
recently questioned the distinction between trespass and trespass on the case, but
concluded not to reexamine it. Aldridge-Poage, Inc. v. Parks, 297 S.W.2d 632
(Ky. 1956). See 46 Ky. L.J. 636 (1958) for a discussion of this case.
"7See Prosser, Torts § 7 (3d ed. 1964) for a general discussion.
"Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 Va. L. Rev. 359
(1951); Smith, Liability for Substantial Physical Damage to Land by Blasting, 33
Harv. L. Rev. 542, 667 (1920); Note, io Colum. L. Rev. 465 (191o); Note, 19 Minn. L.
Rev. 322 (1935); t6 Texas L. Rev. 126 (1937).
"Colton v. Onderdonk, 69 Cal. 155, 1o Pac. 395 (1886); Garden of the Gods
Village, Inc. v. Hellman, 133 Colo. 286, 294 P.2d 597 (1956); Scranton v. L. G. De
Felice & Son, 137 Conn. 58o, 79 A.2d 6oo (1951); Opal v. Material Serv. Corp., 9
Ill. App. 2d 433, 133 N.E.2d 733 (1956); Enos Coal Min. Co. v. Schuchart, 243 Ind.
692, 188 N.E.2d 4o6 (1963); Central Exploration Co. v. Gary, 219 Miss 757, 70 So.
2d 33 (1954); Thigpen v. Skousen 9: Hise, 64 N.M. 290, 327 P.2d 8o02 (1958); Bluhm
v. Blanck & Gargaro, Inc., 6- Ohio App. 451, 24 N.E.2d 615 (1939); City of Muskogee
v. Hancock, 58 Okla. i, 158 Pac. 622 (1916); Bedell v. Goulter, 199 Ore. 344, 261
P.2d 842 (1953); Federoff v. Harrison Constr. Co., 362 Pa. 181, 66 A.2d 817 (1949);
Hickey v, McCabe 9- Bihler, 3o R.I. 346, 75 Atl. 404 (191o); Wallace v. A. H. Guion
& Co., 237 S.C. 349, 117 S.E.2d 359 (196o); Whitney v. Ralph Myers Contracting
Corp., 146 W. Va. 130, 118 S.E.2d 622 (1961); Brown v. L. S. Lunder Constr. Co.,
240 Wis. 122, 2 N.W.2d 859 (1942).
-'The language used by courts in denouncing the distinction relied upon in
the minority jurisdictions is exemplified by the statement made by Judge Given in
Whitney v. Ralph Myers Contracting Corp., supra note ig, at 626: "One [rocks and
debris] is as much a trespass as the other [concussions or vibrations]. The damage
caused a plaintiff are [sic] as real in one case as in the other." See Brooks v. Ready
Mix Concrete Co., 94 Ga. App. 791, 96 S.E.2d 213 (1956); Hickey v. McCabe &
Bihler, 3o R.I. 346, 75 Atl. 404 (1910); Brown v. L. S. Lunder Constr. Co., 240
Wis. 122, 2 N.W.2d 859 (1942).
"Longtin v. Persell, 3o Mont. 3o6, 76 Pac. 699 (1904); Crino v. Campbell, 68
Ohio App. 391, 41 N.E. 2d 583 (1941): Gossett v. Southern Ry., 115 Tenn. 376, 89
S.W. 737 (9o5). The basis for liability under the nuisance doctrine is the judicial
determination that the rights and interests of another have been invaded, and not
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liability based upon the ultrahazardous nature of blasting.-
22
Once a court determines that there would be liability if the non-
negligent blaster were a private contractor, it must then determine the
effect of the doctrine of governmental immunity upon the contractor's
liability.
It is generally held that a non-negligent public contractor is not
liable for "'incidental injuries necessarily involved in the perform-
ance of the contract.' "23 The purpose of this principle is to pro-
tect a contractor from suit when he does some act which is a neces-
sary and inherent feature of his contract with the state, and not to
protect him from suit when his activities in carrying out his contract
inadvertently and unnecessarily cause injury to an innocent third party.
The principle seems to be a circular way of stating that a negligent
contractor is not entitled to immunity, since when the damages are
not necessarily incident to the contract performance, the contractor
has necessarily been negligent.
The general principle is easily stated, but the courts differ as to
its application. The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia cites the
"necessary incident" principle and holds that the principal case falls
within its meaning.24 However, in Whitney v. Ralph Myers Contract-
ing Corp.,25 which was almost identical to the principal case,26 the
West Virginia court held the public contractor liable for concussion
damage resulting from blasting irrespective of negligence and refused
to grant immunity.27 The court held that the principle is not appli-
the fact that a certain act has been committed. Restatement, Torts, scope and in-
troductory note to chapter 40 (i93g). Liability may be predicated upon an inten-
tional invasion of another's rights, or a negligent invasion, or conduct which is
not normal to the surrounding and which falls within the principle of strict liability.
Prosser, Torts § 88, at 595 (3d ed. 1964). The interference with the other's interest
must be substantial and it must be unreasonable in comparison with the utility
of the defendant's conduct. Id. at 602. The court must weigh the conflicting interests
of each party in making its determination of whether a nuisance exists, and social
interests are important factors in determining the utility of the defendant's con-
duct. Restatement, Torts § 826, comment b (1939); Prosser, Torts § go, at 618 (3d
ed. 1964).
--E.g., Richard v. Kaufman, 47 F. Supp. 337 (E.D. Pa. 1942); Antinozzi v. D. V.
Frione & Co., 137 Conn. 577, 79 A.2d 598 (1951); Brown v. L. S. Lunder Constr.
Co., 240 Wis. 122, 2 N.W.2d 859 (1942).
243 Am. Jur. Public Works & Contracts § 83, at 827 (1942). This is quoted in
full in the principal case. V. N. Green & Co. v. Thomas, supra note i, at 637.
-V. N. Green & Co. v. Thomas, supra note i, at 637.
W146 W. Va. 130, 118 S.E.2d 622 (ig6i).
2Plaintiff was a landowner whose property had been damaged by concussions
from defendant's blasting operations which were undertaken pursuant to a con-
tract with the state for the construction of a highway.
=Supra note 25.
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cable to such a situation because the concussion damages that resulted
were not necessarily inherent in the exact performance of the con-
tract.28
Whitney holds that the immunity principle applies only to cases
where the damage which results is " 'direct or consequential,' and
which may result 'as a necessary incident from the performance of
the contract,' ",29 as where the defendant has graded a portion of the
plaintiff's land pursuant to a contract which expressly required that
such land be graded.30 In the principal case there is no evidence that
the resulting damage was necessary to the performance of the contract,
rather it seems clear that it was not.31 Following the logic of Whitney,
it appears that the principal case is mistaken in applying the immunity
principle.
Several problems arise from the decision in the principal case. Per-
haps the most notable is that by denying immunity to negligent state
contractors engaged in blasting activities, yet granting immunity to
non-negligent state contractors so engaged, the court draws an artificial
distinction between negligence liability and strict liability for ultra-
hazardous activities.32 Plaintiff's injury is the same in either case, and
in each, liability is predicated upon the actor's creation of foreseeable
risk of harm. The creation of these foreseeable risks of harm, whether
by negligent or ultrahazardous activity, should incur liability when
injury results. 33 Thus, the considerations which deny immunity to
negligent state contractors should also deny immunity to non-negligent
state contractors and subject them to strict liability. It is the ultrahaz-
ardous nature of their non-negligent activity which should be the
basis of liability.
Another problem in extending governmental immunity to this
situation is that it places the burden of loss upon the innocent vic-
2Id. at 63o-31.
2Supra note 25, at 630. In so holding the court said, "To conclude otherwise
would, in effect, permit a contractor ... to shake down residences of every individual
citizen within eighteen hundred feet of any highway where such construction is in
progress, though not necessary or incidental to the work required to be performed,
without liability." Id. at 631.
wChargois v. Grimmett & James, supra note 5.
aThere is no evidence that plaintiff's land was specifically designated in the
contract for any damages, nor does the contract indicate that dynamite was the only
reasonable means of performing the contract.
"'There is really no clear dividing line between the two theories. Gregory, supra
note 18; Peck, Absolute Liability and the Federal Tort Claims Act, 9 Stan. L.
Rev. 433 (1957)-
'312 Stan. L. Rev. 691, 69,t (ig6o); Restatement, Torts § 519 comment b (1938).
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tim rather than upon the one engaging in the blasting.3 It is highly
inequitable to place the inevitable loss upon the one who had no
knowledge or control over the ultrahazardous activity. A sounder
policy of loss allocation places the economic burden upon the opera-
tor of the ultrahazardous activity by holding him strictly liable for
any damage that results from such activity. The ultrahazardous op-
erator is the one who stands to benefit from his activities, and it is he,
rather than one who had nothing to do with operating the ultrahaz-
ardous activity, who should assume the risk.35 Thus the initial loss
would be placed upon the one who profits from the ultrahazardous
activity and would ultimately, through price adjustment in the con-
tract with the state, be distributed among the public which is bene-
fitted by the government improvements. In short, why should the
plaintiff in the principal case finance to a greater extent than other
taxpayers the building of an interstate highway?
30
3in Exner v. Sherman Power Constr. Co. a contractor stored dynamite at a
construction site which exploded and damaged a nearby house. In holding the
contractor liable, the court said that blasting was an activity which entailed liability
without fault and there was no reason to distinguish between accidental explosions
of stored dynamite and intentional explosions. In placing the burden on the con-
tractor the court said, "[W]hen a person engages in such a dangerous activity, useful
though it be, he becomes an insurer .... [and] the owner of the business, rather
than a third person who has no relation to the explosion, other than that of in-
jury, should bear the loss." 54 F.d 510, 514 (2d Cir. 1931). Accord, Whitman Hotel
Corp. v. Elliott SL Watrous Eng'r Co., 137 Conn. 562, 79 A.2d 591, 595 (1951).
"Defendant is not regarded as engaging in blameworthy conduct. He is cre-
ating hazards to others, to be sure, but they are ordinary and reasonable risks
incident to desirable industrial activity. Sound social policy, however, requires that
the defendant make good the harm that results even though his conduct is free
from fault." 2 Harper & James, § 14.6 at 816 (2d ed. 1956).
-Plaintiff might have attempted to recover on the basis of an unlawful taking
by the state, but his chances of recovery on that theory would have been remote.
The United States Supreme Court has ruled that to constitute a taking under the
Fifth Amendment, the injury must be a direct result of the authorized state project
and must constitute an appropriation of the plaintiff's land. United States v. Causby,
328 U.S. 256, 261-62 (1946); Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269, 275-76 (1897). It
is likely that the concussion damage would not be considered a direct result of
the project, and, since the plaintiff did not allege that he had been substantially
ousted and deprived of the beneficial use of his land, it is doubtful that the
injury would be considered an appropriation.
Another means plaintiff might have used to attempt recovery is the equal
protection of the laws clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Although most cases
arising under the clause have been based upon some sort of racial discrimination
or upon discriminatory legislation directed at certain classes of persons, there may
be some merit in the assertion that the plaintiff has been denied the equal protec-
tion of the laws. The equal protection clause applies to all persons similarly situ-
ated, and when there are rational grounds for doing so, persons may he grouped
into classes with certain rights attaching to each. Graves v. Minnesota, 272 U.S. 425
(1926); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (191). Plaintiff might
argue that the refusal to grant him recovery would result in his paying more than
